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Electronic marketplaces are a popular phenomenon, both for academics and for 
practitioners. During the last two to four years we have seen several e-
marketplaces trying to find their niches. One of the most discussed e-marketplace, 
especially in the business press, is Covisint, the “big” e-marketplace of the car 
industry. Because Covisint is so well known, it has become an example and a model 
for other industries. By taking a closer look at Covisint, we intend to gain insights 
that can contribute to knowledge about the emergent field of industrial e-
marketplaces.  
 
1.  Introduction 
As part of the "dot.com" evolution of the late 20th and early 21th century we have 
seen an e-marketplace hype and many companies have or have had plans of: 
1. Being a partner in an electronic marketplace.  
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2. Buying or selling at an e-marketplace.  
3. Starting an independent e-marketplace.  
The best known and the most often written about industrial e-marketplace today in 
business press is probably Covisint (with the outstanding example of Enron), an 
electronic marketplace in the car industry. Academic litterature on Covisint is 
limited (Baldi and Borgman 2001, Chorafas 2001, Helper and MacDufie 2000). 
Other e-marketplaces in the automotive industry are Endorsia (supplier-biased e-
marketplace) and Supplyon (supplier-biased e-marketplace). Volkswagen and 
BMW have started private exchange platforms in 2000. Several other industries 
have been and are looking at Covisint as a model for how to organise an electronic 
marketplace for an industry.1  In this paper the following questions asked are; how is 
Covisint being adopted and assimilated, how does Covisint work and what kinds of 
problems does Covisint face. By taking a closer look at Covisint, focusing on 
European activities, we can hopefully gain insights about the emergent field of 
industrial electronic marketplaces.  
Several researchers have conducted research on business-to-business electronic 
marketplaces (Malone and Yates 1989, Bakos 1991a, Bakos 1991b, Bailey and 
Bakos 1997, Bakos 1998, Segev, Gebauer and Färber 1999, Kaplan and Sawhney 
2000, Wise and Morrison 2000 and Lucking-Reiley and Spulber 2001). Several of 
them have written about the e-marketplace concept, about characteristics and 
differences between different kinds of electronic marketplaces. Segev have 
conducted interesting research on electronic procurement (Segev, Gebauer and 
Färber, 2000).  
Bakos (1991a) have investigated the pre-requirements of establishing a 
marketplace, and looked at the strategic implications of electronic markets. We find 
this interesting because this, the issue of strategic implications is what our empirical 
data indicates that practitioner’s wonder about when they discuss electronic 
marketplaces.2  
Bakos outlines five characteristics of electronic market systems that explain, from 
an economic perspective, the strategic potential and the impact of the structure and 
efficiency of markets. In the section on strategic potential of Covisint below, we 
will look at Covisint using Bakos five characteristics of an electronic market 
system. These are; reduced cost, network externalities, switching costs, economies 
of scale and scope and uncertainty. We are well aware of the theoretical limitations 
of Bakos’ article with regards to a focus on search costs.  
We will also investigate Covisint through the success factors described by Segev, 
Gebauer and Färber (1999). In the article Segev bring up critical success factors for 
electronic marketplaces that are relevant in our discussion on the e-marketplace 
Covisint. Segev’ analysis of success factors succeeds Bakos in that usage is 
presumed. The first success factor is the ability of the marketplace to attract a 
                                                        
1 Interviews with four large global companies in different industries winter 2001/2002  
2 Interviews with eight large global companies in different industries winter 2001/2002  
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sufficiently large number of participants, i. e., buyers and sellers. The second 
success factor concerns the marketplace needing to balance the interests and 
objectives of those market actors. The third factor is technical, electronic 
marketplaces have to be designed in a way that supports a large number of users in 
a high transaction-volume web-based environment. The last factor is the ability to 
integrate and manage catalogue content. This factor has stalled and/or prohibited 
substantial e-market initiatives at a number of multinational firms.3 
To some extent, especially with regards to the points of network externalities and 
reduced cost, and the ability attracting users and balancing user interests, the two 
frameworks are overlapping. We do not believe that this is problematic, rather that 
it reinforces the importance of these. 
To gain an understanding of what is happening with Covisint, we have interviewed 
actors involved in Covisint and the car industry. The actors interviewed are; one 
customer and partner of Covisint4, one potential customer and partner5, one big 
supplier6 and Covisint themselves.  
The paper is structured as follows: We start with a brief introduction to the e-
marketplace concept, after which a description of Covisint and the development of 
Covisint to date is presented. We then analyze Covisint and the impact of Covisint 
on the industry using Bakos five characteristics and Segev's success factors. To 
conclude we summarize lessons learned by the Covisint case and discuss the results. 
 
2.  Electronic Marketplaces B2B 
2.1 Definitions 
There exists a number of different definitions of what an electronic marketplace is.  
“An electronic market represents a virtual place where buyers and sellers meet to 
exchange goods and services. Either side of the market – buyers and sellers or their 
representatives can host it as well as third parties.“ (Segev, Gebauer and Färber, 
1999)  
“Electronic Markets in the broader sense may be understood as information 
systems supporting one or more phases and functions of coordination within market 
systems.“ (Schmid, 1993) 
                                                        
3 Interviews with eight large global companies in different industries winter 2001/2002  
4 European Project manager e-procurement and European purchasing manager 
5 Global Purchasing manager 
6 Global eBusiness manager 
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“An electronic market is an inter-organizational information system that fosters 
market based exchanges between agents in all transaction phases.“ Bakos (1997) 
 
2.2 How to Categorise Electronic Marketplaces? 
One way of categorising electronic marketplaces is by determining whom the 
buyers are and what kind of products are bought and sold on the electronic 
marketplace (Barratt and Rosdahl, 2002).  
The main factor of a vertical marketplace is that it only operates within one specific 
industry, both buyers and sellers come from the same industry to exchange products 
(for example steel, paper, chemical etc.). On vertical marketplaces production-
related products (direct material) are bought and sold.  
Horisontal marketplaces are categorised as operating with cross-industry buyers. 
The horizontal e-marketplace sells non-production-related products (indirect 
material). 
Procurement activities are often divided into direct, production-related procurement 
and indirect, non-production-related procurement (Zenz, 1994). Researchers 
conducting research on e-procurement also divide between direct- and indirect 
procurement (Segev, Gebauer and Färber, 2000). However, research shows that 
companies have problems with seeing what are indirect goods and services and 
what are direct, there is confusion regarding what is indirect material and what is 
not, and which products and services are suitable for e-procurement and which are 
not (Arbin, 2002). 
For different companies an e-marketplaces can be both a vertikal and a horisontal. 
Covisint can be said to be both a vertikal and an horisontal e-marketplace. On 
Covisint buyers can buy both non-production related and production related 
products.  
An important characteristic of an electronic marketplace is its bias. There are buyer-
biased e-marketplaces, seller-biased e-marketplaces and neutral e-marketplaces. 
When a marketplace favor buyers it is said to be buyer-biased. When it is favouring 
sellers it is said to be a seller-biased marketplace. Neutral marketplaces, are 
according to Kaplan and Sawhney  the true market makers because they are equally 
attractive to buyers and sellers (Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000). Buyers or sellers do 
not establish these marketplaces, they are set up by an independent company. The 
independent company brings togheter buyers and sellers. (Barratt and Rosdahl, 
2002) 
Covisint can be said to be a buyer-biased e-marketplace and Endorsia can be said to 
be a supplier-biased e-marketplace. 
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3.  History and Status of Covisint 
On February 25, 2000, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company and General Motors 
jointly announced plans to combine efforts and form a single global business-to-
business supplier exchange. The companies brought together their individual e-
business initiatives to ease the burdens of the suppliers.7 The idea was to create one 
exchange and to decide on one common technology standard for the industry. The 
new organisation was temporarily named NewCo. The goal was to create a single 
automotive exchange handling $300 billions in annual procurement. The Exchange 
was going to be based on technologies from Commerce One and Oracle. 
In March 2000, the planning team, including executives from DaimlerChrysler, 
Ford´s Auto-Xchange and GM's TradeXchange, moves into its temporary 
headquarters in Detroit. On April 14, 2000, French automaker Renault S.A. and 
Nissan of Japan join the NewCo planning initiative. Renault and Nissan lead the 
development of the European and Asian operations respectively. In May 2000 the 
partners choose the name Covisint and in June, supplier Delphi Automotive, a GM 
spin-off, hops on board. 
In July the Federal Trade Commission review of Covisint begins a review in which 
Covisint receives clearance on September 11. The review come to the conclusion 
that Covisint is not a case for further investigation. Covisint launches the exchange 
on September 29. Its initial suite of software tools includes auctions, catalogues, 
quote management and collaboration. 
In October, Covisint Europe sets up headquarters in Amsterdam and in November 
Fords’ Auto-Xchange and GMs’ TradeXchange begin their integration into 
Covisint. One hundred thousand users are expected to be connected at Ford to 
Covisint by the end of 2002. In December Covisint becomes a legal entity, the 
organisation is a multi-member joint venture known officially as Covisint, with 
DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, Nissan, Renault, Commerce One and 
Oracle as members. 
Covisint initially had problems finding a chairman, but on April 18 2001 Kevin 
English was named CEO. English came to Covisint from a position as managing 
director and CEO of e-commerce at investment banking firm Credit Suisse First 
Boston and was previously CEO of financial news Web site, TheStreet.com. In May 
2001, Covisint Europe begins operations in Amsterdam and PSA Peugeot Citroen 
joins. In July 2001, Covisint opened the Asia-Pacific office in Tokyo. 
Today (January/February 2002) Covisint claims that they can see “successful 
usage” across the automotive industry during the year 2001.8  The figures of usage 
presented below are for Covisint worldwide. When asked about usage in Europe, 
Covisint claims that there is little or no activity.9  Covisint have no supplier 
                                                        
7 Covisint information material 
8 Marketing Manager, Covisint Europe 
9 Marketing Manager, Covisint Europe 
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catalogue connected in Europe. There have been a few auctions in Europe, but 
nothing else. 
Figures of usage: 
Auctions 
More than 1 400 events. 
Over $51 billion in transactions. 
 
Catalogues 
More than 200 Catalogues. 
More than 95 000 transactions. 
 
Covisint offers services in the following areas: collaboration, procurement, supply 
chain management and portals. There is no activity on collaboration, supply chain 
management and portals in Europe. The only area where some activity can be seen 
is in procurement. Procurement is a difficult area for Covisint, especially the 
catalogue service. This problem relates to cost levied by Covisint on suppliers and 
lack of technical know-how at Covisint and suppliers.10 
The revenue model for Covisint catalogue service is as follows: 
The suppliers pay Covisint 1% on turnover at Covisint plus a yearly subscription 
fee on $9000.  
Covisint claims that they support each customer’s unique procurement process 
needs for both production and non-production material.  
Covisint offers catalogues, auctions, quote manager and asset control, and provides 
tools and services to convert product information (supplier information) into an 
electronic catalogue. With the Covisint buyer auction tool, a buyer can establish an 
on-line event, invite participating suppliers to submit bids and conduct the auction 
in a matter of hours. Covisint quote manager provides an environment to enhance 
the communication between buyers and potential suppliers. Quote manager is an 
electronic document management, analysis and collaboration tool that supports the 
automotive sourcing process. Below we analyse Covisint focusing primarily on the 
procurement service. 
 
                                                        
10 Interviews with Covisint, suppliers and customers/owners 
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4.  Analysis 
In the analysis, five theoretical marketplace characteristics are used. These 
characteristics are based on Bakos (1991a). 
1. Reduced cost. 
2. Network externalities. 
3. Switching costs. 
4. Economies of scale and scope. 
5. Uncertainty. 
 
4.1 Reduced Cost 
The first theoretical characteristic is potentially reduced costs, for both the customer 
and the supplier. The customer-reduced cost theoretically comes from a simpler 
search process, the reduced cost for the supplier comes from a simpler search 
process for potential customers. Bakos believes cost reduction is likely to affect the 
“monopoly power” of the suppliers. Bakos claims that the cost reductions will have 
implications for the efficiency of the industry in terms of search costs experienced 
by buyers and their ability to locate appropriate sellers. 
 
4.2 The Covisint Case and Reduced Cost 
The partners of Covisint are arguing the case of reduced costs, both when talking to 
participants and when talking to potential suppliers. The buyers (Ford, GM, 
DaimlerChrysler, Renualt, Nissan and Peugeot-Citroen) at Covisint are large 
companies with frame agreements, and their main purpose when using the 
catalogue service at Covisint is to navigate and control purchases made by their 
own organizations. Through increased volumes, they can negotiate better prices 
with their suppliers and achieve lower purchasing prices (Arbin, 2002). By steering 
their own organization to buy only from predetermined suppliers, the buying 
company gets better control over purchases, and can discover price discrimination 
on different markets. The search cost for finding products is hence reduced for the 
buyer, the employees in the organization do not have to spend time searching for 
the right product, since they are only allowed to order products through the 
catalogue hosted by Covisint. Because of the predetermined frame agreements, the 
possibility for a supplier to find new customers through the marketplace is low. 
By using the auction function in Covisint, buyers have the theoretical possibility of 
comparing prices, and suppliers have the theoretical possibility of reaching new 
customers. This is mainly an advantage for new suppliers since they might find 
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outlets for their products. Existing suppliers are not positive towards auctions and 
claim that they lead to price pressure and in the long run to lower quality in 
products. 
On the questions of the industry becoming more efficient with Covisint and if cost 
reductions are likely to affect "the power" of the supplier, the jury is still out. 
Looking at the empirical data, no change can be detected for users when negotiating 
prices and finding suppliers. Even so, the buyers’ ability to locate sellers may 
increase, but the buying companies using Covisint do only have access to their own 
catalogues with their own pre-negotiated prices, which means that transparency will 
not be increased.  
From the case we can see that focus for Covisint itself is to reduce customer cost, 
and that suppliers have difficulties in seeing how they can reduce their cost through 
Covisint. What we also can see is a struggle for power over pricing which might be 
indicative of the emergent state of Covisint. 
4.3 Network Externalities 
The second theoretical characteristic is network externalities, in short that 
the benefits realized by individual participants in an electronic market 
increase as more organizations join the system.  
4.4 The Covisint Case and Network Externalities 
To increase the number of suppliers (buyers already in place) has been a problem 
for Covisint. Without supplier participation Covisint can not function. Because of 
the current state of a non-existent reduction of supplier costs, suppliers are not that 
interested in joining Covisint.  
The situation can be described as a stand-off between buyers who have invested 
money in the marketplace, and suppliers who think it is unfair to pay a middleman 
that they have not generated and over which they have no control. 11  
In the autumn 2001, Ford and GM decided that they have to be tuff on their 
suppliers not joining Covisint, indicating that suppliers have to join or otherwise 
risk loosing business. Recently Ford backed down. Suppliers do not have to pay the 
transaction fee on 1 %, for now. The suppliers have so far been using the tactic of 
having their catalogue on Fords own supplier network in order not to pay 
transaction fees.  
Not all buyers in the car industry are interested in joining Covisint. One factor for a 
buyer to consider when joining Covisint is supplier strategy. The potential 
customer/partner may have many sub-contractors, and they may believe that 
                                                        
11 This information comes from an interview in November 2001 with one of the owners (a 
customer) of Covisint 
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Covisint will cost too much for their sub-contractors. The potential customer 
interviewed has chosen to have theirs own e-procurement system to control 
purchasing in order to get lower prices from their suppliers. The eBusiness manager 
of the potential customer interviewed says that they want a good long-term 
relationship with their suppliers. They do not want to force the supplier to join 
Covisint, which bring extra costs for the supplier; both direct costs (the transaction 
and the subscription fee), and indirect costs (the cost of creating and managing the 
electronic catalogue).  The company has a “win-win” perspective on the 
relationship between them and their suppliers, and has decided not to use auctions 
in order to lower prices. 
To date (February 2002) there is no big supplier connected to the catalogue service 
in Europe, but several suppliers have participated in the auction service.   
4.5 Switching Costs 
The third theoretical characteristic is switching costs. Electronic markets can 
impose significant switching costs on their participants due to large investments in 
hardware, software, employee training and organisational transformations.  
4.6 The Covisint Case and Switching Costs 
In the Covisint case there is potentially substantial switching costs, both for the 
buyer and for the supplier. The owners of Covisint have invested approximately 
$300 million, a large incentive to get Covisint working and to stay with Covisint as 
a marketplace. For the owners of Covisint, Covisint will hypothetically accord the 
large switching costs locking them into their own creation.  
For a supplier there are switching costs, in terms of having to create an electronic 
catalogue according to the soft- and hardware standards of Covisint. Because there 
are no database standards for product information in the car industry, it is difficult 
for the supplier to use Covisints catalogue system in order to communicate with 
other marketplaces and customers. The interviewed supplier has several different 
technical solutions for different customers. A problem for them is that the 
marketplace and the different customers require different technological solutions 
and tailor-made systems for every customer is considered costly. 
4.7 Economies of Scale and Scope 
The fourth theoretical characteristic is economies of scale and scope. Electronic 
market systems typically require large capital investments and offer potential 
substantial economies of scale and scope. A marketplace usually incurs large 
system development and maintenance costs, and when transactions increase there 
will be relatively small incremental costs for each additional transaction. (Bakos, 
1991) Technological and organisational resources and expertise acquired during the 
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development and operation of one system may be transferable to other systems, 
resulting in economies of scope. 
4.8 The Covisint Case and Economies of Scale and Scope 
Covisint´s owners have in April 2001, spent a combined $170 million on their 
electronic marketplace, including $50 million of consulting services. The site now 
costs at $12million a month. The partners expect to spend up to $350 million before 
break-even, which they hope will be by the end of 2002. The business plan called 
for $186 millions in revenue in 2001. Covisint pulled in approximately $15 million. 
(The figures include both Europe and the US.) Web buying and online supply-chain 
management was envisioned saving $1,500 to $3,600 per vehicle, savings of up to 
$1.6 billion in profits for Ford, GM and DaimlerChrysler each.  
The owners of Covisint want to increase the number of transactions placed in the 
organisation internal electronic catalogue system. A large obstacle for buying 
companies implementing e-procurement is the need to change behaviour of the 
people making purchases in an organisation, to start buying products electronically 
instead of using the phone and fax. It is easy to underestimate the time it takes to 
implement an e-procurement system. 
4.9 Uncertainty 
The fifth theoretical characteristic is uncertainty regarding the benefits of joining an 
e-marketplace. Occasionally this uncertainty remains after an organisation joins the 
system. This uncertainty can affect the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers by 
inducing them to adopt a “wait and see” strategy. 
4.10 The Covisint Case and Uncertainty 
Uncertainty surrounds Covisint. We have not yet seen a successful industrial e-
marketplace. The buyers seem more certain about Covisint than the suppliers. 
Covisint do have a problem with the “wait and see” strategy that most suppliers 
have adopted.  
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5.  Conclusions: Strategic Potential and Critical Success 
Factors 
5.1 Strategic Potential  
The above used five economic characteristics hypothetically determine the strategic 
potential of electronic marketplaces. When analyzing Covisint according to the 
characteristics we see that Covisint is facing several problems.  
5.2 Reduced Cost 
Covisint is focusing on reducing costs. For a marketplace to work there must be 
incentives for both buyers and suppliers. Baldi and Borgman (2001) claim that the 
Covisint example shows that consortium-based exchanges will face problems unless 
both buyer and seller see value in joining the exchange. In theory the supplier costs 
will be reduced (Chorafas, 2001), but the empirical evidence shows that Covisint 
has positioned themselves as an intermediary generating more costs than value for 
the supplier.  
5.3 Network Externalities 
The lack of participating organizations on the supplier side is closely connected 
with the reduced cost problem. It seems crucial for Covisint that they get suppliers 
“on board”, in order to get out of a sub critical mass situation.  
5.4 Switching Costs 
Covisint has succeeded in creating switching costs for its creators via sizeable 
investments in hardware, software, employee training and organizational 
transformations. It might be difficult for a competing e-marketplace to lure existing 
customers and suppliers away from Covisint.  
5.5 Economies of Scale and Scope and Uncertainty 
Today we get the distinct impression that Covisint is in a “learning phase”, and it 
will probably take some time before they will be able to obtain economies of scale 
and scope. The problem of potential buyers and suppliers “wait and see” strategy 
remains.  
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5.6 Critical Success Factors 
The analysis below is conducted by using the success factors by Segev et al., 
introduced in Segev et al. (1999). The “success factors” have as far as the authors 
can se not been defined with regards to non-successful or non-effective factors. But 
to compliment Bakos prerequisites, the success factors are in our opinion worth 
using. 
5.7 Ability to Attract a Large Number of Participants 
Segev claims that the viability of the market place most depends on the ability to 
attract a sufficiently large number of participants on either side of the market. In the 
case of Covisint, it has succeeded in attracting participants on the buying side, but 
not on the selling side. 
5.8 The Need to Balance Interests and Objectives 
Covisint has not yet managed to balance the interests and objectives of all market 
players. Covisint is clearly a buyer-biased electronic marketplace. 
5.9 Technical Knowledge and Expertise 
Suppliers complain about the lack of technical knowledge and technical ability at 
Covisint. According to suppliers Covisint still has a lot to learn when it comes to 
technical issues as integration. 
5.10 Integration and Management of Catalogue Content 
Covisint offer suppliers content service, for a price. Many suppliers have their own 
electronic catalogues which they manage themselves.  In order to integrate with 
Covisint they have to customize it. 
The conclusion is that Covisint is facing several problems. Two of them seem 
especially fundamental: 
• The "unbalanced" business model, i. e., the lack of reduced costs for suppliers 
would seem to be a substantial impediment for attracting suppliers and would 
seem to keep the market systems in a potentially permanent sub critical state. 
• The lack of the technical readiness and ability of Covisint i. e., Covisint is 
apparently not in an operational state, and if Covisint can not technically 
integrate the catalogues, customer can not buy through Covisint, and if 
customers can not buy the marketplace does not exist. 
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Covisint in Europe is not being adopted with the exception of the auction service. 
Covisint does not seem to work. In order to work and in order to overcome its 
current problems, it would seem that they need to develop technological abilities 
and change the revenue model. At presence we fail to see how Covisint generates 
value in the market place. 
 
6.  Discussion 
The purpose of markets and market systems, electronic or otherwise embodied, is to 
bring the buyer and the seller, the customer and supplier, together into a shared 
venue.  The outstanding feature of Covisint to date is the lack of supplier interest in 
joining the marketplace, which Covisint are providing.   
One of the more curious actions of Covisint, maybe an overlap from car industry 
history in which hierarchical relations were primary, is the push strategy that are 
implemented towards potential marketplace actors;  a strategy that on occasion 
apparently borders on a shotgun wedding approach for generating a solution to a 
non-existent problem. Given what Covisint and others are purportedly interested in 
achieving, a more market-based industry in which both short-term transactions and 
long-term relationships are driving evolution, the word counter-productive would 
seem a mild description of recent events. 
The car industry has used EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) for decades and there 
exist small number of electronic marketplaces among car industry actors.  Since 
Covisint has yet to deliver an operational marketplace, for instance no functional 
ordering system for real-time transaction exists, it is difficult to understand how (a) 
the venture will ever get out of a sub-critical mass situation and that (b) the wants 
and needs Covisint should generate more than cursory interest.  
The car industry is of course like other industries in that new technology holds 
promise of various benefits and drawbacks.  Electronic market systems certainly 
has the potential of shifting the market balance from seller to buyer, and an effort 
on the scale of Covisint would seem to have the potential of becoming a significant 
part of the infrastructure of the car industry.  If this materialises is however another 
issue. 
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